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EC Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted2 – hereinafter the Qualification Directive - 
combines two forms of international protection: traditional or classical refugee protection under 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees3 (namely, refugee status), and subsidiary 
protection under human rights law (namely, subsidiary protection status) – the content of which 
had remained until then at the discretion of the Member States. The Qualification Directive was 
created as ‘the heart of the Common European Asylum System’;4 it is one of the most important 
pieces of European legislation introduced in the area of asylum because it expands the scope of 
states’ obligation towards refugees under international refugee law to include other persons in 
need of international protection under international human rights law.5 
 
This article focuses on a key aspect of the Qualification Directive, namely the grounds of 
eligibility for subsidiary protection. These grounds rest on a test for ‘serious harm’ which would 
be present if the applicant were returned to his or her country of origin. If a genuine risk of such 
harm is found, the applicant would qualify for protection. Article 15 of the Directive defines the 
‘serious harm’ in terms of (a) death penalty, (b) torture or degrading treatment, and (c) ‘serious 
and individual threat’ to a person arising from a situation of armed conflict. In this article, we 
examine how English (to mean England and Wales) judicial authorities have applied the third 
paragraph (i.e., Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive) in recent asylum cases. In such 
cases, English and French judicial authorities have had to assess (1) the severity of armed 
conflict and (2) measuring individual risk to asylum seekers. We argue that such assessments 
                                                
1 Dr. Hélène Lambert, Reader in Law, University of Westminster, and Professor Theo Farrell, Department of War 
Studies, King’s College London. We wish to thank most sincerely Roger Errera and Mark Symes for providing us 
with material not easily accessible to the public. We also thank Martin Bayly for his research assistance. Professor 
Farrell’s work was funded by an ESRC/AHRC Fellowship (RES-071-027-0069) awarded under the Research 
Council’s Global Uncertainities Programme. 
2 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, Official Journal L 304, 30/09/2004 p.0012 – 0023. 
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into 
force 22 April 1954. 
4 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection, 
COM (2001) 510 final, p.2. The Qualification Directive has its legal basis in Article 63(1)(c) of the EC Treaty. 
5 Hélène Lambert, ‘The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, Its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom 
and International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (2006), 161-192; Jane McAdam, ‘The 
European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime’, International Journal of 
Refugee Law 17 (2005), 461-516. 
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must be informed by an understanding of the changing character of armed conflict, which has 
increased the threat to civilians in conflict, and by the human security paradigm, which offers a 
new way of conceptualising the threats to individuals in and from conflict. 
 
 
2. THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE AND ARTICLE 15(c) 
 
It is generally recognised that the Qualification Directive draws on the Member States systems 
and best practices on subsidiary protection which themselves reflect the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights and general principles of international humanitarian law.6 
Regarding Article 15, a distinction can be drawn between Article 15(a) and (b) which draw on 
prescribed standards, and Article 15(c) which draws mainly on state practice,7 ‘except insofar as 
it has regard to the right to life enshrined in ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] 
article 2’.8 Prior to the adoption of the Qualification Directive, the practice of most EU states was 
not to return unsuccessful asylum seekers at risk of serious human rights violations and/or who 
had fled civil war or generalised violence.9 In HH (Iraq) for instance, the Court of Appeal (for 
England and Wales) referred to a ‘departmental operational enforcement manual’ which for 
many years and until 14 January 2008 (date when it was withdrawn) stated: ‘Enforcement action 
should not be taken against Nationals who originate from countries which are currently active 
war zones’.10 Even though such policy was never made public (to avoid attracting too many 
nationals from countries at war or countries where ‘uncontrolled violence is endemic’), Article 
15(c) elevated this practice to a minimum standard with the effect that ‘the practice of the UK 
and many other European states in this regard has in large part acquired the force of law’.11 In 
France, protection in the form of territorial asylum (asile territorial) was recognised to persons 
whose life was threatened or who were at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.12 This 
form of protection was therefore most relevant to Algerian nationals fleeing the civil war and to 
whom Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention did not apply because civil war, as a ground of 
refugee protection, was not then recognised. This Government’ practice of granting territorial 
asylum to person fleeing a civil war or treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR was replaced by the 
concept of subsidiary protection following the transposition of the provisions of the Qualification 
Directive in the Act of 10 December 2003, incorporated into the Immigration and Asylum Code 
(Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile or Ceseda, 2003). 
                                                
6 Commentary on Article 15, COM (2001) 510 final, pp.5-6. See also Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 
16 May 2002 on the Commission proposal (O.J. C/2002/278/ 44). Note that this reference aside, neither the original 
proposal nor the final text of the Qualification Directive refer to international humanitarian law; yet the latter clearly 
refers to international refugee law and international human rights law as a legal framework. 
7 Qualification Directive (EC Directive 2004/83), Preamble, Recital (25). 
8 Court of Appeal in QD & AH (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 620 (24 
June 2009), para.21. 
9 UNHCR, Submissions, Annexure 1: State Practice in 1999, in the Court of Appeal C5/2008/1706 on Appeal from 
the IAT, QD & AH (Iraq) v Secretary of State Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 620 
(24 June 2009). 
10 Secretary of State for the Home Department v HH (Iraq) [2009[ EWCA Civ 727. 
11 HH (Iraq), para.6. 
12 UNHCR, Submission, Annexure 1, QD and AH (Iraq). In addition, the Aliens Act pf 11 May 1998 provided for 
constitutional asylum but its relevance has remained very limited in practice. See Hélène Lambert, Francesco 
Messineo, and Paul Tiedemann, ‘Comparative Perspectives of Constitutional Asylum in France, Italy, and Germany: 
Requiescat in Pace?’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27 (2008), pp.16-32. 
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The complexity (and resulting ambiguity) of the drafting history of Article 15 is well-commented 
in McAdam’s Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law and so will not be 
discussed here.13 Suffice to say that between 2001 and 2004, Article 15 (and paragraph (c) in 
particular) was the subject of much discussion and re-drafting in the Council. The final text ‘is 
said to reflect existing practice in Member States … The result is a political compromise’.14 In 
the end, it is a blend between Member States’ obligations under the Temporary Protection 
Directive, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation (2001) 18 on 
subsidiary protection of 27 November 2001, and ‘EU Member States’ repeated support for 
UNHCR’s mandate activities for victims of indiscriminate violence (linked to other regional 
agreements such as the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration)’.15 
 
The final text of the Qualification Directive was adopted by the Council on 29 April 2004. The 
text of the provisions in the Directive most relevant to the issue of armed conflict follows. Note 
that the Commission of the European Communities recently considered an amendment of Article 
15(c) to be unnecessary in view of the interpretative guidance provided by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in the case Elgafaji (Justice and Home Affairs) C-465/07 (17 February 2009) `and 
of the fact that the relevant provisions were found to be compatible with the ECHR’.16 Hence, 
the current discussion on a proposal aiming at remedying the deficiencies identified in the 
Qualification Directive and at addressing the concerns expressed by the member states,17 has no 
effect on Article 15(c). 
 
Article 2(e) of the Qualification Directive provides: 
 
(e) ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ means a third country national or a stateless 
person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have 
been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of 
origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual 
residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, 
and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not apply (exclusion clauses), and is unable, or, 
owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. 
(our emphasis) 
 
According to Article 15 
 
Serious harm consists of: 
 
                                                
13 Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
14 McAdam, Complementary Protection, p.64. 
15 McAdam, Complementary Protection, p.71. 
16 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection 
and the content of the protection granted, COM (2009) 551 final, Brussels 21.10.2009, p.6. 
17 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the protection granted – Impact Assessment, SEC 
(2009) 1373 final, Brussels 21.10.2009. 
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(a) death penalty or execution; or 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an 
applicant in the country of origin; or 
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
internal armed conflict. (our emphasis) 
In addition, recital (26) in the Preamble to the Directive provides that 
Risks to which a population of a country or a section of the population 
is generally exposed do normally not create in themselves an 
individual threat which would qualify as serious harm. (our emphasis) 
And recital (10) provides:18 
This Directive respects for fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognized in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. In particular this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for 
human dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and their 
accompanying family members. (our emphasis) 
The Qualification Directive considers the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol as the 
‘cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees’.19 It further refers to 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights20  and to ‘international obligations under human rights 
instruments and practices existing in the Member States’.21 As far as treatment of persons 
covered by the Directive is concerned, other instruments of international law are relevant too.22 
 
Key elements of Article 15(c) have been examined on numerous occasions by the domestic 
courts (including the French Conseil d’Etat and the Court of Appeal for England and Wales) and 
once so far by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
 
3. THE APPROACH OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH COURTS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 
15(c) 
 
In this section, we shall discuss the interpretation given by the English and French courts to the 
key elements of Article 15(c). 
 
3.1. The English Courts (for England and Wales) 
                                                
18 Thanks to Mark Symes for pointing out this recital in his skeleton argument. Mark Symes, ‘Skeleton Argument, 
GS Afghanistan and Secretary of State for the Home Department’, 4 July 2009, p.3 and p.9 (on file with the authors) 
19 Qualification Directive, Preamble, Recital (3). 
20 Qualification Directive, Preamble, Recital (10). 
21 Qualification Directive, Preamble, Recital (25). 
22 Qualification Directive, Preamble, Recital (11). 
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The Qualification Directive has been implemented in the UK by the Refugee or Person in Need 
of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations SI 2006/2525 and the Statement of 
Changes in Immigration Rules, Cm6918. Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive has so far 
been examined by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) and the Court of Appeal in the 
following cases: HH (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022, KH 
(Article 15c Qualification Directive) Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 00023, AM & AM (armed conflict: 
risk categories) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 03444, and GS (Article 15(c): indiscriminate 
violence) Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00044, before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, 
and QD & AH (Iraq) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 620 (24 
June 2009), before the Court of Appeal.23 In addition, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) gave 
its first (urgent) preliminary ruling on Article 15(c) on 17 February 2009 in the case Elgafaji 
(Justice and Home Affairs) C-465/07. With the exception of GS (Article 15(c): indiscriminate 
violence) Afghanistan CG decided by the AIT on 22-23 July 2009 and discussed in the context of 
assessing conflict severity and serious threats (section 5.), all other cases are discussed in this 
section below. 
 
3.1.1. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal - pre-Elgafaji 
 
According to the AIT case-law predating the 2009 ruling from the ECJ in Elgafaji, most 
prominently KH (Iraq),24 key terms in Article 15(c) must be given an International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) meaning. As a consequence, the phrase ‘a civilian’s life or person’ must be 
interpreted through the lens of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, i.e., 
‘violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture’ but not ‘threats which amount to inhuman and degrading treatment’.25 The AIT, 
however, accepted that ‘the phrase must encompass the means for a person’s survival’.26 And in 
AM & AM (Somalia), it recognized that:  ‘A person may be able to succeed in a claim to 
protection based on poor socio-economic or dire humanitarian living conditions under the 
Refugee Convention or Article 15 of the Qualification Directive or Article 3, although to succeed 
on this basis alone the circumstances would have to be extremely unusual’.27 The AIT also 
agreed that Article 15(c) must be regarded as having some scope additional to that contained in 
Article 15(a) and 15(b)28 - the ‘added value’ being that it is concerned not just with actual harm 
but also with a lesser form of harm, i.e., a threat of harm.29  
 
The phrase ‘by reason of indiscriminate violence’ is concerned with violence closely related to 
the conduct of military operations (i.e., violence inflicted by combatants) and which violates the 
norms of IHL by failing to discriminate between military and civilian targets or because it 
                                                
23 In addition, the Court of Appeal decided Secretary of State for the Home Department v. HH (Iraq) [2009] EWCA 
Civ 727 (14 July 2009), a case raising issues under Article 15(c), yet these issues were not directly the subject of the 
appeal. 
24 KH (Article 15(c) Qualification Directive) Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 0002. 
25 KH (Iraq), para.105. 
26 KH (Iraq), para.104. 
27 AM & AM (armed conflict: risk categories) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 03444, para.2. 
28 KH (Iraq), para.29; AM & AM (Somalia), paras.109, 179. 
29 KH (Iraq), paras.29 and 127. 
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employs means which disproportionately affects civilians, or is random or untargeted in nature.30 
Thus, certain types of violence are not covered by Article 15(c), such as, purely criminal 
violence, domestic violence, or any other type of non-military violence because they are not 
particularly of ‘international concern’.31 In this regard, KH (Iraq) differs from HH (Somalia) in 
its finding that looting, for example, would not be covered by Article 15(c). 
 
Moving on to the interpretation of ‘individual’, the leading authority on refugee protection in 
situations of armed conflicts (i.e., protection under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention) is Adan.32 In this case, the House of Lords distinguished between two types of 
harm: harm inherent in the ordinary incidents of civil war (i.e., internal armed conflict) and harm 
involving risks over and above such incidents. However, not much was said about ‘the critical 
factor which distinguishes persecution from the ordinary incidents of civil war’ (as per Lord 
Lloyd).33 In relation to subsidiary protection (i.e., Article 15(c)), the AIT recognised that 
‘individual’ threat or risk exists if there is a sufficiently serious threat or risk to all civilians so 
that ‘merely being a civilian will not suffice; something more relating to the person’s specific 
characteristics or profile or circumstances, must be shown’;34 they must be ‘truly at risk’.35 
However, the AIT ‘does not require personal threats to an individual, or that they be at greater 
risk than are others’.36 
 
In addition, AM & AM (Somalia) added to the discussion in KH (Iraq) in two respects. One, it 
elaborated the causal requirement for a person to show a serious and individual threat ‘by reason 
of’ indiscriminate violence. The AIT explained that in order for the indiscriminate violence to be 
an ‘effective cause’, the serious harm does not have to be a direct effect of the indiscriminate 
violence, ‘it is sufficient if the latter is an operative cause’.37 Thus, some kind of causal nexus is 
required that is more than only remote.38 Two, it expanded the analysis of the intensity of the 
violence. In this case, it was found that in addition to a worsening of the security situation, the 
humanitarian situation had deteriorated as characterised by mass displacement.39 Could such 
deterioration amount to persecution, serious harm or ill-treatment?40 The AIT explained that it is 
not just the number and geographical distribution of internally displaced persons (IDPs) that is of 
concern, it is also their treatment and denial of basic human rights; their movements are impeded 
                                                
30 KH (Iraq), para.93. 
31 KH (Iraq), paras.95-96. 
32 Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] 2 WLR 703. 
33 The Strasbourg Court has not excluded that in certain extreme circumstances, such circumstances could give rise 
to a violation of a non-derogable right (AM & AM (Somalia), para.79). Furthermore, for ill treatment to arise under 
Art.3, it does not necessarily have to be intentional or deliberate. ‘Hence, whilst there will always be heavy factual 
obstacles in the way of a finding that socio-economic circumstances can constitute persecution, there is no reason of 
principle why a claim of this kind cannot succeed’ (para.79). 
34 KH (Iraq), para.123. 
35 Symes, Skeleton Argument’, p.6. 
36 Symes, Skeleton argument’, p.6. 
37 AM & AM (Somalia), para.3. 
38 AM & AM (Somalia), para.97. 
39 AM & AM (Somalia), paras.150-155. 
40 In HH (Iraq), the AIT found that a person displaced from Mogadishu who was likely to have to spend any 
significant period of time in a makeshift shelter alongside the road to Afgoye, for example, or an IDP camp, may 
well experience ill-treatment under Article 3 ECHR (AM & AM (Somalia), para.151, referring to HH (Iraq), 
para.299). 
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by hundreds of checkpoints (where threats, intimidation, looting –and in the case of women and 
girls) rape, abduction and harassment can take place). A significant number of IDPs do not end 
in camps or makeshift settlements and are therefore subject to more insecurity (unable to obtain 
shelter, food, water, sanitation, or protection against rape, abduction and harassment). Finally, 
the effect of displacement also appears to reduce the ability of IDPs to count on protection of 
their own clan. The AIT was not, however, persuaded that ‘the situation in central and southern 
Somalia generally has reached the threshold where civilians per se or Somali civilian IDPs per se 
can be said to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm or treatment proscribed by Article 3 
ECHR’41 for the following reasons: (1) the numbers of those killed and wounded are not of great 
magnitude; (2) it does not appear that civilians per se face a real risk of denial of basic food and 
shelter and other bare necessities of life (indeed many appear not to need humanitarian assistance 
and many who do need it, get help of some kind); (3) the great majority of the huge number of 
IDPs are able to travel and then subsist in IDP camps or settlements without serious setbacks. 
 
The AIT then applied these ‘principles’ to the facts of the case, i.e., to the evidence gathered on 
the two applicants. The first applicant’s appeal was dismissed on asylum, humanitarian 
protection (Article 15(c)) and human rights grounds (Article 15(b)) because it was found that he 
was from Jowhar, a town where the population is not in general exposed to serious harm and 
there was no longer any significant fighting there (as the insurgents have gained control of it). 
The second applicant’s appeal was allowed on asylum and human rights grounds, and not Article 
15(c), because  he and his family members were from the Sheikhal Logobe clan, not a majority 
clan, thus he was unlikely to find protection from serious harm in Mogadishu if returned there 
from the UK. Hence, real risk of persecution (on grounds of race or ethnicity), serious harm and 
treatment contrary to Article 3 were found to exist and, in addition, there was no viable internal 
relocation alternative elsewhere in Somalia because this applicant  had spent the last 5 years in 
the UK. 
 
3.1.2. The ECJ’s ruling in the Elgafaji case 
 
Whilst the British courts were pursuing their search for the meaning of Article 15(c), the Dutch 
Raad van State was deciding a case that required it to consider the meaning of ‘individual’, a 
term not entirely clear at the time of adoption of the Qualification Directive, particularly in the 
light of Recital (26) and considering the context of ‘indiscriminate violence.42  By application of 
Article 68 of the EC Treaty, the Raad van State referred questions to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation of this provision of EC law (i.e., Article 15(c)). 
 
Consistent with UNHCR position,43 the ECJ in its ruling in Elgafaji (Justice and Home Affairs)44 
favoured a liberal interpretation of an ‘individual’ threat that is situational or geographical rather 
than purely personal: 
                                                
41 AM & AM (Somalia), para.156. 
42 UNHCR Statement on Subsidiary Protection under the EC Qualification Directive for People Threatened by 
Indiscriminate Violence, January 2008, pp.4-5. 
Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/479df7472.html [accessed 10 November 2009] 
43 UNHCR Statement on Subsidiary Protection  under the EC Qualification Directive for People Threatened by 
Indiscriminate Violence, January 2008, p.6.  
Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/479df7472.html [accessed 10 November 2009] 
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the word ‘individual’ must be understood as covering harm to civilians 
irrespective of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate violence 
characterising the armed conflict taking place … reaches such a high 
level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, 
returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant 
region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that 
country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat 
referred in Article 15(c) of the Directive (pararagraph 35) 
 
According to the ECJ, such interpretation does not contradict the wording of Recital (26) since 
the word ‘normally’ in Recital (26) allows ‘for the possibility of an exceptional situation which 
would be characterised by such a high degree of risk that substantial grounds would be shown for 
believing that that person would be subject individually to the risk in question’.45 
 
This ruling is furthermore consistent with the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in 
Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands in which it recognized that ‘[i]t might render the protection 
offered by that provision illusory if, in addition to the fact that he belongs to the Ashraf …, the 
applicant be required to show the existence of further special distinguishing features’.46 And 
even more explicitly the European Court of Human Rights has now ruled in NA v United 
Kingdom that: 
 
…the Court has never excluded the possibility that a general situation of violence in a 
country of destination will be of sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal 
to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court would 
adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence, where there is 
a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such 
violence on return.47 
 
It follows that in low level situations of indiscriminate violence, ‘a clear degree of 
individualisation’ is required under Article 15(c), namely ‘the applicant will have to show that he 
is specifically affected [but not targeted48] by reason of factors particular to his personal 
circumstances’.49 Equally, in exceptionally high level situations of indiscriminate violence, the 
fact that the applicant comes from that geographical location would be sufficient to establish the 
existence of ‘substantial grounds’ that s/he would be subjected ‘individually’ to the risk in 
question. Thus, it has been argued ‘Article 15c offer[s] more protective potential than simply 
addressing the plight of classes of civilians all equally at risk’.50 Moreover, past exposure to 
                                                                                                                                                       
See also UNHCR Submission in the Court of Appeal C5/2008/1706 on appeal from the AIT QD and AH (Iraq) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Annexure 1, para.31. 
44 [2009] ECJ C-465/07 (17 February 2009). 
45 ECJ, Elgafaji, para.37. 
46 Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands, Application No.1948/04, 11 January 2007, para.148. 
47 NA v United Kingdom, Application No. 25904/07, 17 July 2008, para.115. 
48 ECJ, Elgafaji, para.43. This means that the applicant does not need to be singled-out. 
49 ECJ, Elgafaji, para.39. 
50 Symes, Skeleton Argument, p.7. 
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violence from an armed conflict contributes to reducing the level of violence needed to be 
shown.51 
 
The ECJ in Elgafaji also explained that ‘Article 15(c) of the Directive is a provision, the content 
of which is different from that of Article 3 of the ECHR, and the interpretation of which must, 
therefore, be carried out independently, although with due regard for fundamental rights’ as 
guaranteed in the ECHR.52 Hence, the ECJ sees Article 3 ECHR protection ‘as squarely provided 
by Article 15(b)’ and recognises that Article 15(c) goes beyond Article 3; the key question is 
‘how much beyond?’53 According to the ECJ, the harm defined in Article 15(c) (namely, a 
serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person) ‘covers a more general risk of harm’ 
than the harm defined in Article 15(b) for instance which refers to more specific acts of 
violence.54  
 
The ECJ further dismissed an IHL reading of Article 15(c) and so rejected any reference made to 
violence that failed to observe the principles of IHL. As a result, it interpreted the phrase 
‘indiscriminate violence’ as any form of violence which ‘may extend to people irrespective of 
their personal circumstances’.55 
 
Finally, the ECJ appears to consider the element of ‘serious’ as relevant in order to define the 
gravity of the threat, namely, the severity of the armed conflict and resulting indiscriminate 
violence, as a defining element of ‘individual’. 
 
Notwithstanding the ruling of the ECJ which is binding on the Member States, states have 
retained some latitude in the overall interpretation of Article 15(c) as well as in the specific 
application of the ECJ ruling to the facts of the case at hand. For example, in QD & AH (Iraq), 
the first case to have been decided by the Court of Appeal for England and Wales since the 
ECJ’s ruling in Elgafaji, the Court held: ‘While this formulation [i.e., the interpretation of 
‘individual threat’ by the ECJ] leaves open a very large area of factual judgment, it answers so 
far as can be done …’.56 
 
3.1.3. The approach of the English Court of Appeal in QD & AH (Iraq) – post-Elgafaji 
 
In the Court of Appeal, Sedley LJ disagreed with much of the AIT’s approach to ‘the true 
meaning and effect’ of Article 15c adopted in KH (Iraq), which it nonetheless commended for its 
lucid and scholarly quality. Most notably, the Court of Appeal rejected an IHL reading of Article 
15(c) because of differences in the object and purpose of international refugee law and IHL, 
preferring instead to regard the Qualification Directive as autonomous, i.e., as capable of 
‘stand[ing] on its two legs’.57 This is an interpretation that is shared by Professor Goodwin-Gill: 
                                                
51 Symes, Skeleton Argument, p.7. 
52 ECJ, Elgafaji, para.28. 
53 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Challenges to the Protection of Refugees – Compliance with International Law’, paper 
finalized for the Blackstone Chambers Asylum Law Seminar that took place on 31 March 2009 (on file with the 
authors). 
54 ECJ, Elgafaji, para.33. 
55 ECJ, Elgafaji, para.34. 
56 QD & AH (Iraq), para.26. 
57 QD & AH (Iraq), para.18. 
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‘Given the object and purpose of Article 15(c) itself (protection from the risk of indiscriminate 
violence), the qualifying context ought to be one in which IHL may be illustrative, but cannot be 
determinative’,58 as well as UNHCR (Intervener before the Court of Appeal): ‘whilst IHL law is 
a source of law that can inform the interpretation of Article 15(c), caution is warranted in seeking 
to draw too heavily on IHL’.59 
 
The Court of Appeal also recognised that Article 15(c), ‘both on its own and even more so when 
married with Article 2(e), is highly problematical’ because of its ‘poor drafting’.60 Such 
ambiguity is most apparent in the text of ‘a real risk’ of a ‘threat’, an ‘individual threat’ from 
‘indiscriminate violence’, and an ‘armed conflict’ when ‘there may well be only one source of 
indiscriminate violence’.61 
 
On the first point, a ‘risk’ of a ‘threat’, the Court of Appeal opted for a pragmatic approach, 
finding that ‘risk’ in Article 2e overlaps with ‘threat’ in Article 15(c), ‘so that the latter reiterates 
but does not qualify or dilute the former’.62 More specifically on the issue of the seriousness of 
the threat or harm, the Court of Appeal considers that Article 15(c) is ‘intelligibly concerned 
with serious threats of real harm’,63 i.e., those ‘endemic acts of indiscriminate violence’, such as 
the placing of car bombs in market places and snipers firing methodically at people in the streets. 
It is less concerned about fear resulting from ‘threats of violence the primary purpose of which is 
to spread terror among the civilian population’.64 In seeking to determine the kind or degree of 
risk to individuals required to bring a situation of armed conflict within the purview of Article 
15(c), the Court of Appeal found that the threshold of risk was set too high in KH (Iraq).65 It 
rejected the requirement of a ‘consistent pattern’ (expressed in AA (Zimbabwe))66 on the ground 
that ‘The risk of random injury of death which indiscriminate violence carries is the converse of 
consistency’.67 In this regard, it may be recalled that the ECJ’s ruling stated that ‘The “threat […] 
to a civilian’s life or person” in Article 15(c) is more general than specific acts of violence and 
“that threat is inherent in a general situation of ‘international or internal armed conflict’”.68 As 
discussed below, this is also the interpretation adopted by the French courts. 
 
                                                
58 Goodwin-Gill, ‘Challenges to the Protection of Refugees – Compliance with International Law’, paper finalized 
for the Blackstone Chambers Asylum Law Seminar that took place on 31 March 2009 (on file with the authors), 
para.10. 
59 UNHCR Submission, Annexure 1, in QD & AH (Iraq), para.20. 
60 QD & AH (Iraq), para.19. 
61 QD & AH (Iraq), para.19. 
62 QD & AH (Iraq), para.29. This is consistent with UNHCR’s submission to the Court of Appeal in this case, and 
which does not separate Article 15(c) from Article 2(e) and thus considers that ‘in order for a person to benefit from 
SPS [subsidiary protection status] under Article 15(c), the Court must be satisfied that there is a “real risk” of a 
“serious…threat to an individual’s life or person”’ (UNHCR’s submission, Annexure 1, para.46). Hence, “serious” 
threat helps to define the severity of the harm at risk – serious threat should not be read as an additional element to 
the real risk test. UNHCR Submission, Annexure 1, para.56. 
63 QD & AH (Iraq), para.31. 
64 QD & AH (Iraq), para.28. 
65 QD & AH (Iraq), para.18. 
66 AA (Zimbabwe) [2007] EWCA Civ 149. 
67 QD & AH (Iraq), para.32. 
68 QD & AH (Iraq), para.34. 
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On the second point, ‘individual threat’ from ‘indiscriminate violence’, the Court of Appeal 
embraced the ECJ’s ruling in Elgafaji, namely, 
  
the word ‘individual’ must be understood as covering harm to civilians 
irrespective of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate violence 
characterising the armed conflict taking place … reaches such a high 
level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, 
returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant 
region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that 
country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat 
referred in Article 15(c) of the Directive (paragraph 35, Elgafaji) 
 
The Court of Appeal explained that with this ruling, ‘the ECJ has sought to reconcile two things 
which Advocate-General Maduro in his Opinion (§31) has described as seeming “prima facie 
irreconcilable” – an individual threat arising from indiscriminate violence’.69 The Court of 
Appeal further explained that the use of word ‘exceptionally’ meant that not every armed conflict 
or violent situation will attract the protection of Article 15(c), but rather only the most violent 
situations will result in civilians as a population or group being able to show a real risk to their 
life or person under Article 15(c).70 As for the term ‘by reason of indiscriminate violence’, it 
implies that ‘without anything to render them a particular target, civilians face real risks to their 
life or personal safety’.71  
 
UNHCR, in its submission to the Court of Appeal as Intervener, explained: ‘From the 
perspective of refugee/human rights law, the distinction between violence employed against 
military targets and civilians is a false one. The correct distinction is between violence giving 
rise to a well-founded fear of persecution and violence that does not but which nonetheless gives 
rise to the need for international protection outside the regime of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention’.72 UNHCR thus highlighted a protection gap resulting from KH (Iraq): ‘where 
armed conflict leads to a break down in law and order leading to endemic criminal violence, 
those fleeing would be unable to claim SP because the violence would not be committed against 
civilians in breach of the Geneva Conventions’.73 And yet, refugee law and human rights law 
protect against persecution or treatment inflicted by non-state actors.74 This is an important point 
because in many conflicts it is in fact very difficult to distinguish between threats of violence 
emanating from combatants and those deriving from mere criminals. Indeed there is nothing in 
Article 15(c) limiting the source of violence as long as it arises in the context of an armed 
conflict. This is because refugee law/human rights law imposes obligations on host states, and 
not on the parties to an armed conflict. 
 
                                                
69 QD & AH (Iraq), para.25. 
70 QD & AH (Iraq), para.25. 
71 QD & AH (Iraq), para.25. 
72 UNHCR Submission, Annexure 1, para.45.2. 
73 UNHCR Submission, Annexure 1, para.45.3. 
74 E.g., Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department, House of Lords, judgment of 6 July 2000, [2001] 1 
AC 489 (a refugee law case), and D. v UK (European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 2 May 1997) and N. v 
UK (European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 27 May 2008), both human rights law cases. 
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On the third point, ‘armed conflict’ when ‘there may well be only one source of indiscriminate 
violence’, the Court of Appeal accepted the proposition agreed upon by both parties as well as 
the UNHCR as Intervener, that the phrase ‘situations of international or internal armed conflict’ 
in Article 15(c) ‘has an autonomous meaning broad enough to capture any situation of 
indiscriminate violence, whether caused by one or more armed factions or by a state, which 
reaches the level described in Elgafaji’.75 The Court of Appeal then clarified that there was ‘no 
requirement that the armed conflict itself must be exceptional. What is, however, required is an 
intensity of indiscriminate violence – which will self-evidently not characterise every such 
situation – great enough to meet the test spelt out by the ECJ’,76 i.e., the ‘substantial grounds’ 
and ‘real risk’ tests as expressed in paragraph 35 of the ECJ’s ruling. And the Court of Appeal 
specified that a civilian within the context of Article 15(c) means any ‘genuine non-
combatants’;77 the UNHCR also includes within this terminology ‘former combatants who can 
demonstrate that they have renounced military activities’.78 
 
The Court of Appeal concluded by considering ‘the critical question, in the light of the Directive’ 
to be: 
‘Is there in Iraq or a material part of it such a high level of indiscriminate violence that 
substantial grounds exist for believing that an applicant such as QD or AH would, solely by 
being present there, face a real risk which threatens his life or person?’79 
 
In sum, the English courts’ case-law reveals the following elements: 
• Article 15(c) may not be read in the light of IHL 
• Article 15(c) is concerned with serious threats of real harm and does not require a 
consistent pattern of risk 
• Only the most violent situation will attract the protection of Article 15(c); there is no 
need to show that an individual is particularly targeted 
• In cases of armed conflict, the key, determining element should be the intensity of 
indiscriminate violence – which is not the same thing as the requirement that the armed 
conflict be exceptional. Such intensity may find evidence in a worsening of the security 




3.2. The French courts 
 
The meaning of Article 15(c) has also been examined by the French courts on numerous 
occasions, particularly by the Refugee Appeal Tribunal (Commission de Recours des Réfugiés - 
CRR), now the National Asylum Court (Court Nationale du Droit d’Asile - CNDA), and by the 
Conseil d’Etat. Decisions from the French courts are not as informative as decisions from the 
English courts in their legal reasoning. However, useful information can be found in conclusions 
                                                
75 QD & AH (Iraq), para.35. 
76 QD & AH (Iraq), para.36. 
77 QD & AH (Iraq), para.37. 
78 UNHCR Statement on Subsidiary Protection under the EC Qualification Directive, January 2008, p.7. See also 
UNHCR Submission, Annexure 1, in QD & AH (Iraq). 
79 QD & AH (Iraq), para.40. 
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of the Commissaire du Gouvernement who, as members of the Conseil d’Etat, represent the 
public interest in a given case. It is their task, in tandem with the other judges, to survey the law 
on a particular issue and to present their personal opinion. Their role is only advisory but, unlike 
in civil cases, it is a principle of administrative procedure that the Commissaire du Gouvernment 
provides a reasoned opinion in all administrative cases.80 
 
Article L.712-1 Cedesa (Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile)81 
provides that the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA) shall grant 
subsidiary protection to asylum seekers who do not meet the requirements laid down by the 
refugee definition but who have proved that they could be exposed to one of the following 
serious threats (menaces graves): 
[…] (c) serious, direct and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of generalised 
violence (violence généralisée) in situations of international or internal armed conflict.  
 
French legislation (i.e., Article L.712-1c Cedesa) – and French jurisprudence on Article 15(c) – 
therefore does not use the phrase ‘indiscriminate violence’ as provided in the Qualification 
Directive. Rather it uses ‘generalised violence’ as provided in the Directive on Temporary 
Protection. Furthermore, French legislation adds to the requirements of ‘serious and individual 
threat’ that of ‘direct’. 
 
The French courts have adopted a more flexible approach towards IHL than the Court of Appeal 
(for England and Wales) and the ECJ, when interpreting Article 15(c), as illustrated by the two 
following examples. In M. Azzine Ahmed,82 the then Refugee Appeal Tribunal recognised that 
the applicant had left a situation of indiscriminate violence resulting from the existence of an 
internal armed conflict in Darfur as provided by Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 12 
August 1949. In M. Baskarathas, the Conseil d’Etat simply noted that the different parties to the 
conflict (including LTTE members and national army forces) were all guilty of grave breaches of 
IHL towards civilians. However, M. Julien Boucher, Commissaire du Gouvernment in this case, 
referred to a number of IHL provisions and reports.83 Thus, it has been said that, at the very least, 
IHL is used in ‘spirit’, that is, the idea that non-combatants should be kept away from the 
fighting and that combatants should not kill or threaten them.84 This means that if violence is 
generalised or indiscriminate, civilians are not kept away or protected, and therefore they are in 
need of protection. In the words of Sophie Albert: ‘subsidiary protection supplements unapplied 
IHL in conflict – Article 15(c) is necessary when IHL is not in force. That is the spirit of the 
                                                
80 See John Bell, French Legal Cultures (London: Butterworths, 2001), p. 160, and John Bell, Judiciaries within 
Europe – A Comparative Review (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 75 and 82. 
81 To read more on subsidiary protection in France, in particular on issues of transposition, see Vera Zederman, ‘The 
French reading of subsidiary protection’, Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Part II(A): France, pp.18-19, in 
International Association of Refugee Law Judges, Convention Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection Working 
Party – First Report, IARLJ 7th World Conference, Mexico City, November 2006. 
82 Application no.538807, 22 November 2005. 
83 E.g., the 1977 Second Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of non-
international armed conflicts (Article 1). To read more on this, see Roger Errera, ‘The ECJ and Subsidiary 
Protection: Reflections on Elgafaji – and After’, Paper for the European Asylum Law Judges Association – 
European Academy Workshop, Berlin, October 19-20, 2009 (on file with the authors). 
84 Email correspondence with Dr. Sophie Albert, Head of the Litigation Section of the Legal Affairs Division at the 
French Office for the protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), 25 September 2009. 
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subsidiary protection regime’.85 This reasoning by the French courts has the advantage of 
situating Article 15(c) in relation to IHL. 
 
French case-law on the risk or threat arising from situations of armed conflict is further 
characterised by an overlap between refugee protection and subsidiary protection. It has been 
observed that ‘the existence of an armed conflict is not an obstacle to refugee status recognition 
and [Article 15(c)] is not necessarily the standard for those fleeing from a war’.86 This 
jurisprudence goes back to a decision of the Conseil d’Etat from 1997, finding that situations of 
armed conflict (in this case (the former) Yugoslavia, particularly Sarajevo) could, in principle, 
create a fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.87 
With this decision, the Conseil d’Etat put an end to the jurisprudence of the Refugee Appeal 
Tribunal developed over many years and according to which dangers arising from a ‘state of 
war’ or a ‘civil war’ did not as such constitute risks of persecution within the meaning of the 
Refugee Convention.88 
 
This overlap is further emphasised by the fact that under both the Refugee Convention (i.e., case 
law) and the Qualification Directive (i.e., the text of Article 15(c)), the risk of persecution or 
threat to a civilian’s life or person must be ‘individual’. Thus, in Mlle Strbo, a case about 
protection under the Refugee Convention, the applicant was refused refugee status because she 
had failed to show a ‘fear of persecution of a personal character’, having based her fear instead 
on ‘the general situation in that city [Sarajevo]’.89 However, an ‘individual’ fear of persecution 
was found with regard to Mrs Adamovic because she could show that ‘she had just scraped out 
from an attempt that killed one of her colleagues’.90 Article 15(c) Qualification Directive too 
requires the threat to a civilian’s life or person to be ‘individual’. In addition, the threat has to be 
‘serious’ (Article 15(c), Qualification Directive) and ‘direct’ (Article L.712-1c, Ceseda). French 
jurisprudence tends to look at all three elements together. For instance, in M Azzine Ahmed, the 
then Refugee Appeal Tribunal recognised that the applicant, who had left a situation of 
indiscriminate violence resulting from the existence of an internal armed conflict in Darfur, was 
subject to a serious, direct and individual threat against his life ‘by reason of his noteworthy and 
well-off position’.91 He was therefore granted subsidiary protection. In a most recent decision, 
M. Baskarathas,92 the Conseil d’Etat, embracing the meaning of ‘individual’ as elaborated by the 
ECJ in Elgafaji, recognised that ‘a serious, direct and individual threat’ is not subordinated to the 
applicant having to show that s/he is specifically targeted by reason of some particular 
                                                
85 Ibid. 
86 Laurent Dufour, ‘The 1951 Refugee Convention and Subsidiary Protection: Uncertain Boundaries’, Commission 
des Recours des Réfugiés, Part II(B): France, in International Association of Refugee Law Judges, Convention 
Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection Working Party – First Report, IARLJ 7th World Conference, Mexico City, 
November 2006, at p.34. 
87 Conseil d’Etat, Mlle Strbo, 12 May 1997. 
88 CRR, Miss Abbas-Akarim, 10 February 1984, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war, and CRR, Zein El Abiddine, 13 
June 1985, in the context of the Lebanese civil war; both cited in Laurent Dufour, ‘The 1951 Refugee Convention 
and Subsidiary Protection: Uncertain Boundaries’, Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Part II(B): France, pp.33-
34, in International Association of Refugee Law Judges, Convention Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection 
Working Party – First Report, IARLJ 7th World Conference, Mexico City, November 2006. 
89 Ibid, Dufour, at p.34. Conseil d’Etat, 12 May 1997, application no. 154321, Mlle Strbo, p.188. 
90 Ibid, Dufour, at p.34, referring to Conseil d’Etat, Mme Adamovic, 12 May 1997.  
91 Application no.538807, 22 November 2005. 
92 Application no. 320295, 3 July 2009. 
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characteristics of her/his own where the degree of indiscriminate violence – characterising the 
armed conflict - is such that there exist serious reasons for believing that a civilian would be at 
real risk of a threat (as defined in Article 15(c)) by his/her mere presence on that territory. Its 
Commissaire du Gouvernement, M. Julien Boucher, explained that in other situations where the 
level of violence is not as high (or exceptional), the court would need to consider elements that 
are specific or particular to the individual applicant.93 
 
The notion of ‘individual’ threat was further clarified by the Commissaire du Gouvernement, 
Mme Julie Burguburu, in her conclusions in the case Mlle Bernadette Kona.94 Article L.712-1 
provides that an asylum seeker must prove that ‘they could be exposed to one of the following 
serious threats’. According to Mme Burguburu, the use of the word ‘exposed’ (exposée) entails 
an ‘individual’ element. Referring to the ECJ’s ruling in Elgafaji, she then explains that it is the 
reason at the origin of the threat, i.e., the indiscriminate violence and its severity, which justifies 
subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive. Hence, it is unnecessary for an asylum 
seeker to be specifically targeted. 
 
The overlap between refugee protection and subsidiary protection finds another illustration in the 
Refugee Appeal Tribunal’s requirement of the inability to seek protection from the state 
authorities in order to be eligible for subsidiary protection. For instance, in Mlle Rincon Perez, 
the Tribunal granted subsidiary protection to an applicant from Colombia who, as an accountant, 
had been employed by her parents, land owners in a region occupied by the FARC rebels in 
2001.95 Her cousins had been shot dead by the insurgents. She herself had been the subject of 
pressures and death threats.  Such threats were found to be linked to a general climate of 
indiscriminate violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict prevailing at the time 
in that region of Colombia, without her being able to seek protection from the state authorities. 
 
The Conseil d’Etat further considers that the concept of ‘generalised violence’ (violence 
généralisée) – at the origin of a threat upon which an application for subsidiary protection is 
based – is inherent to a situation of armed conflict (internal or international) and in fact 
characterises it.96 Its Commissaire du Gouvernement, M. Julien Boucher, explained: 
 
‘It would be to disregard  the reality of modern armed conflicts to pretend that resulting 
violence occurs only on the battlefield, which itself  is difficult to define since ordered 
battle  has given way to skirmish wars.’ (Lambert translation) 
 
The Conseil d’Etat then recognised that the existence of ‘generalised violence’ in the form of 
violent attacks and other particularly cruel acts against civilians in the area of Sri Lanka where 
the applicant is from, forced civilians to be displaced. This interpretation by the Conseil d’Etat 
confirms previous jurisprudence by the Refugee Appeal Tribunal/National Asylum Court. For 
instance, in M. Alazawi, the Refugee Appeal Tribunal found that the situation prevailing (at the 
                                                
93 Conseil d’Etat, M. Baskarathas, Application no.3 20295, 3 July 2009, Conclusions du Commissaire du 
Gouvernment Julien Boucher. 
94 Conseil d’Etat, Mlle Bernadette Kona , Application no. 292564, 15 May 2009, Conclusions du Commissaire du 
Gouvernement Julie Burguburu. 
95 29 September 2006. 
96 Conseil d’Etat, M. Baskarathas, Application no. 320295, 3 July 2009. 
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time) in Iraq was characterised by general violence as evidenced by certain cruel acts against 
civilians, such as, violent attacks, killings, kidnappings and muggings.97 It also found that this 
situation was the result of the conflict between Iraqis security forces, Coalition forces, and 
certain armed groups, under responsible command, exercising control over a part of the territory 
and carrying out sustained and concerted military operations. This situation must therefore be 
regarded as one of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict.  
 
Considering the amount of overlap between refugee protection and subsidiary protection, the 
Conseil d’Etat was recently confronted with the problem of having to clarify the relationship 
(i.e., the scope of application) between refugee protection status and subsidiary protection status 
in cases of armed conflict. In the case Mlle Bernadette Kona,98 the Conseil d’Etat quashed a 
decision from the National Asylum Court which had denied refugee status to an applicant from 
Iraq on the ground that the situation of indiscriminate violence in Iraq meant that she should 
(only) be granted subsidiary protection even though the National Asylum Court recognised that 
the violence she feared resulted from her membership to a particular community (‘Christian 
Assyro-Chaldean’) as well as her situation as a well-off, single woman. According to the Conseil 
d’Etat, her membership to a particular social group should have brought her clearly within the 
scope of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. This decision thus re-affirms the primacy of 
protection under the Refugee Convention as stated in the Qualification Directive, Preamble, 
Recital (3), (5) and (24). In other words, if membership to a particular social or ethnic group can 
be shown and linked to the fear of being persecuted, this element shall prevail over the existence 
of an armed conflict, unless the membership ground is too remote from the fear of being 
persecuted. This interpretation must be welcome for it puts an end to a long-standing practice by 
the Refugee Appeal Tribunal/National Asylum Court according to which threats resulting from a 
situation of indiscriminate violence (‘violence généralisée’), even on a Refugee Convention 
ground, should not give rise to protection under the Refugee Convention.99 According to the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement, Mme Julie Burguburu, in this case, the two statuses (Refugee 
Convention and subsidiary protection) do not in fact differ depending on the intensity of the 
threat. Rather they each have their own distinct scope of application which is determined by the 
grounds (or reasons) for the risks incurred. Such a reading of Article L.712-1-c) would have the 
benefit to reduce the scope of application of subsidiary protection, since many armed conflicts 
are based on ethnic or religious grounds, as well as to increase the number of cases of protection 
under the Refugee Convention. 
 
In sum, French jurisprudence reveals the following characteristics: 
• A flexible approach towards the role of IHL in the reading of Article 15(c) – IHL is used 
in spirit. 
• ‘Generalised violence’ (violence généralisée) – at the origin of a threat upon which an 
application for subsidiary protection is based – is inherent to a situation of armed conflict 
(internal or international) and in fact characterises it. The Conseil d’Etat has in this 
                                                
97 Application no. 497089, 17 February 2006. 
98 Application no. 292564, 15 May 2009. 
99 E.g., CRR, sections réunies, 9 October 1998, M. Maxamed, cited in Vera Zerderman, ‘The French reading of 
subsidiary protection’, Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Part II(A): France,at  p.25, in International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges, Convention Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection Working Party – First 
Report, IARLJ 7th World Conference, Mexico City, November 2006. 
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context referred to the forced displacement of civilians as evidence of the existence of 
‘generalised violence’. 
• In cases of armed conflict, the key distinguishing element between subsidiary protection 
and refugee protection is the absence (or existence of) a Refugee Convention ground; it is 
not the existence (or not) of an armed conflict nor the ‘individual’ character (or not) of 
the threat or fear of persecution.  
Yet, it is not always easy to show an ‘individual’ threat without having recourse to a Refugee 
Convention ground. Furthermore, many armed conflicts are based on ethnic or religious ground, 
hence one ends up wondering about the usefulness of Article 15(c) protection in cases of armed 
conflict. The practice of the French courts reveals that subsidiary protection is very much what is 
says it is: subsidiary. Since its adoption, Article L.712-2-c) has been used to provide subsidiary 
protection to persons who fled the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Somalia 
and Sudan but only in non-typical cases, i.e., where people were victims of cross-fire or looting. 
Most asylum seekers coming from these countries have been granted refugee status based on one 
of the Refugee Convention grounds. The latest decision by the Conseil d’Etat in Mlle Bernadette 
Kona seems to suggest that this trend will continue. 
 
 
4. THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE RISE OF HUMAN SECURITY 
 
Article 15(c) raises the question of what is an armed conflict. Strictly speaking, this question 
remains unanswered in international law, as there is still ‘no authoritative definition of armed 
conflict in international law’.100 However a working definition has been offered from two 
authoritative sources. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Tadic held that  
 
an armed conflict exists wherever there is a resort to armed force between 
states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organised armed groups or between such groups within a state. (paragraph 
70)101 
 
Drawing on this and other decisions by the ICTY, as well as interpretations of convention and 
customary law by recognized authorities, the International Committee of the Red Cross recently 
offered the following as an authoritative definition: 
 
Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations 
occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more 
armed groups, or between such groups arising from the territory of a state 
[party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a 
minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a 
minimum level of organization.102 
                                                
100 Natasha Balendra, ‘Defining Armed Conflict’, Cardozo Law Review 29 (6) 2008, pp.2461-2516, at p.2463. 
101 Case No.IT-94-1-T, judgment of 2 October 1995 (jurisdiction). 
102 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Opinion Paper, ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined 
in International Humanitarian Law?’, March 2008, p. 5. 
Available at: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/armed-conflict-article-170308/$file/Opinion-paper-
armed-conflict.pdf [last accessed 10 November 2009] 
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The AIT has, in the past, adopted a definition of armed conflict which is consistent with those 
offered by the ICTY and ICRC. In KH (Iraq), the Tribunal found that four matters needed to be 
investigated in making a determination about the existence of an internal armed conflict: the 
parties to the conflict; their degree of organization; the level of intensity in violence; and the 
protraction of the violent confrontation. As we discuss above, the Court of Appeal (for England 
and Wales) subsequently rejected the application of IHL by the AIT in interpreting the 
Qualification Directive. Both the Court of Appeal (for England and Wales) and the French courts 
agree that the determining element should be the intensity of indiscriminate violence which 
characterises an armed conflict. Thus they have concentrated on the two key issues which 
concern the application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive: namely, the severity of 
the conflict in question and the attendant seriousness of risk to individuals fleeing the conflict. 
As it happens there has been much debate within academia in recent decades over the changing 
character of armed conflict in recent decades and over how to conceptualise security for 
individuals. Both issues have direct bearing on both how to assess conflict severity and how to 
assess the seriousness of risks to individuals. 
 
4.1 New Wars and Human Security 
 
Throughout the Cold War, the focus of Strategic Studies (a subfield of International Relations, a 
discipline which itself originated in the study of war) was on the national security of states and 
the study of interstate war. However, during the 1980s, progress in US-Soviet arms control and 
the promotion of the concept of common security by Soviet Premier Gorbachev, began to shift 
scholarly attention from the challenges of national to international security. At the end of the 
Cold War, the traditional concerns in the academic study of war were replaced by new security 
challenges associated with the decline of centralized state institutions and the dissolution of 
federal states. In response, the focus of Strategic Studies broadened to include internal as well as 
international armed conflict. The 1990s saw the subfield re-branded Security Studies, as it 
expanded to take in a range of issues including economic, political, societal and environmental 
security.103   
 
The 1990s also saw the rise of what were termed ‘New Wars.’ Some of these conflicts were 
developing world legacies from the Cold War (e.g., Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua and El 
Salvador); some were wars that coincided with the end of the Cold War (e.g., the wars of central 
Africa and the former Yugoslavia). All suggested that the character of war had changed from the 
modern form of high-tech and state-on-state warfare, to a pre-modern form of mostly low-tech 
and trans-state warfare. These new wars have been messy affairs involving a broad range of 
military actors, including insurgents, militias, and criminals, as well as state-based military 
forces. New wars are not waged for reasons of state but rather for a mix of motives involving 
greed and grievance: wars are fought to secure resources, and to avenge for perceived past 
wrongs. Moreover, these new wars are characterised by the blurring of the traditional boundaries 
of war in terms of space, time and participants. Where traditionally war was defined by state 
borders, with clearly defined states fighting to control territory, new wars are waged within and 
across state borders. Indeed, the label ‘civil war’ disguises the direct role usually played by 
                                                
103 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn, 
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neighbouring states in such wars, as well as the trans-border political economy of such wars. 
Where war is traditionally distinguished from time of peace (indeed, these separate conditions 
are built into the fabric of international law), the new wars just rumbled endlessly on. War may 
be punctuated by periods of fragile and relative peace but peace rarely lasts. Finally, the lines 
between military and civilian are blurred in the new wars. These are wars without clear battle-
fronts and home-fronts, and where combatants are not easily distinguished from civilians. 
Indeed, the forces of rival factions often involve a mix of former soldiers, forcibly conscripted 
civilians, and criminals.104 Moreover, a number of these new wars have been waged not only 
amongst civilians but also against civilians. This is evident in the conflicts in the Balkans, 
Chechnya, Columbia, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. To be sure, civilians have been targeted in wars past, but the centrality of civilian 
targeting is characteristic of the wars of the 1990s.105Often the goal is to terrorise and thereby 
control or expel particular population groups, and so these new wars have not actually proven 
more lethal for civilians than the great industrial wars of centuries past.106 That said, as we argue 
later, civilian death is an insufficient measure of the level of civilian insecurity in armed conflict. 
 
Alongside the ‘broadening’ of post-Cold War Security Studies to include a new focus on so-
called internal armed conflict (as well as non-military areas of security), there was also a 
‘deepening’ of the concept of security. Most significant here has been the rise of the human 
security paradigm in Security Studies. This represents a whole new way of thinking about 
security, not in terms of securing states but in terms of providing security for people, broadly 
defined to include ‘freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s 
own behalf’.107 This broader definition refers to the right of individuals ‘to live in safety and 
dignity and to earn a livelihood’.108 The human security paradigm also challenges the traditional 
primacy afforded to state sovereignty and our understanding of sovereign legitimacy in providing 
that ‘the state – and state sovereignty – must serve and support the people from which it (in 
theory) draws its legitimacy’.109 The human security concept therefore does two things: it 
focuses directly and specifically on the individual, and it views threats to the physical integrity of 
individuals as security threats.  
 
There are a number of approaches to the human security paradigm. One recent review suggests 
four: the ‘broad approach’ (which considers all threats to human integrity, such as poverty, 
disease, and climate change); a ‘narrower approach’ which considers the ‘human consequences 
of armed conflict and the dangers posed to civilians by repressive governments and situations of 
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state failure’; an ‘umbrella approach’ which considers a range of ‘non-traditional’ security issues 
(e.g., HIV/AIDS, drugs, environment, terrorism, human trafficking etc.; and finally a ‘theoretical 
approach’.110 Distinction may also be drawn between material and non-material approaches to 
human security111 - with the former including physical threats whose impact can be measured 
(e.g., civilian casualties) with physical survival as ‘the bottom line’, and the latter focusing on 
threat to values such as well-being and human dignity. 112 In this article, we apply a narrow, 
material approach, this being the most minimal approach to human security, and consequently 
the one which might be most expected to be accommodated within international protection law 
and practice. 
 
As noted, academics developing the human security paradigm have drawn on theoretical 
approaches to International Relations (i.e., ‘Critical IR Theory’) that question the primacy 
afforded to states and state concerns in the study of world politics.113 In its 1994 annual report, 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP) stated that the concept of security had up until now 
been too narrowly construed and needed expanding beyond the concepts of national security or 
territorial integrity ‘to an all-encompassing [trans-boundary] concept’.114 It presented the ‘idea of 
human security’ as ‘likely to revolutionize society in the 21st century’115 because 
 
It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life.116 
 
As this UNDP annual report suggests, the direction of academic debate has paralleled increasing 
political and public concern with the fate of non-nationals. Indicative of this trend is the post-
Cold War state practice of humanitarian intervention, and activism by non-governmental 
organisations in promoting the responsibility of states to prevent atrocities.117 The 1999 Kosovo 
War proved to be a key test case because there was a clear absence of legal grounds for the use 
of force but, nonetheless, a large coalition of democracies used force for humanitarian purpose, 
and this purpose was recognised by many other states in the international community, even if the 
legality of the action was not.118 In April 2000, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1296 
launching an agenda to monitor and promote the protection of civilians in conflict.119  
 
These two developments – the rise of ‘new wars’ and of the human security paradigm – have 
great significance for how one measures the severity of armed conflict and the risk to individuals 
seeking refuge from such conflict. The traditional measure of conflict severity is battle dead. 
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This is not so reliable in new wars as the line between combatant and civilian is blurred, and 
civilians are often intentionally targeted in such wars. This underlines the importance of civilian 
casualties as a direct measure of conflict severity and indicator of risk to individuals. Finally, the 
human security paradigm suggests the need for measures of how a conflict impacts on 
sustainable living. Below we briefly examine four measures of conflict severity, the latter two 
suggested by the human security paradigm: battle deaths, civilian casualties, population 
displacement and state failure.  
 
4.2 Battle deaths 
The traditional metric of the severity of an armed conflict is the number killed in battle. The 
horror of WWI is routinely summed up by the scale of battle deaths which was somewhere 
between 13 and 16 million.120 Moreover, relative battle dead is commonly used to estimate the 
scale of victory and defeat in war. An oft cited example is the number of Coalition forces killed 
(only 240) in the 1991 Gulf War; there are no precise figures for Iraqi war dead with estimates 
varying from 20,000 to well in excess of 100,000. 121 
Significantly, battle dead is the core metric used to code interstate war in the largest quantitative 
database on war, the Correlates of War (COW) Project. Established in 1963, COW’s aim is to 
collect and disseminate ‘accurate and reliable quantitative data’ on war in international relations. 
1,000 must have died in battle for an interstate dispute to be coded as a war in the COW 
database. By this metric, the conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan (1992-95), Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (1998-2000), and India and Pakistan (1999) are all coded as inter-state wars. However, 
NATO’s campaign against Yugoslavia over Kosovo (1999) is not coded as a war because with 
less than 1,000 military dead, it does not cross the ‘battle-death threshold’.122 COW is primarily 
concerned with militarized interstate disputes. It does gather data on intrastate conflicts and this 
dataset does include conflicts that do not cross the battle-death threshold. But all such cases are 
coded as having -999 battle deaths (this is the designation for cases that would not normally be 
included in quantitative analysis using COW datasets). 
 
4.3 Civilian casualties  
 
The severity of a war may also be measured by the numbers of civilians killed and injured. For 
instance, this metric is commonly applied in analysis of the toll of WWII.123 Indeed, given that 
this was a total war involving the mobilization of whole societies, it was to be expected and 
strategically appropriate that both the Allies and the Axis powers should wage war on civilians 
as well as each others forces. Hence, the slaughter of civilians was integral to the manner of 
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Japan’s conquest of Asia and German’s invasion of the Soviet Union.124 Equally, the Allied 
bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan were both directed against urban centres. Some 
305,000 civilians were killed and 780,000 injured in the Combined Allied Bomber Offensive 
against Germany.125 US Army Air Force bombing of Japan (including the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki) killed some 330,000 civilians and injured 476,000.126 
 
This metric of conflict severity is especially appropriate for internal armed conflicts, which often 
do not involve battle between recognized military forces and often do involve violence directed 
at civilian populations. For example, this applies to three internal armed conflicts which failed 
the COW battle-death threshold but led to loss of civilian life on truly massive scales: Cambodia 
1975-78 (two million dead), Somalia 1990-91 (350,000 dead), and Rwanda 1994 (800,000 
dead).127 
 
This metric can be problematic in application, however. Data on civilian casualties in a specific 
conflict may vary considerably in substance and reliability. Often the parties (state and non-state) 
to a conflict are less interested in gathering accurate data on civilian casualties than in 
manipulating the data to support their own narrative of the conflict. In this sense, the very 
detailed studies by the US Army Air Force of the bombing campaigns in Europe and the Pacific 
were highly unusual. A similar effort was launched by the US Air Force following the 1991 Gulf 
War, but not the 1999 Kosovo War, the 2001-02 Afghanistan War, or the 2003 Iraq War.128  
 
Data on civilian casualties in recent conflicts may be available from non-governmental 
organizations or other independent studies. But even here the figures may vary to a considerable 
degree. Hence an academic study published in The Lancet in October 2004 estimated that there 
were upward of 100,000 civilian deaths as a consequence of coalition military operations in Iraq 
between March 2003 and May 2004.129 In contrast, the Iraq Body Count (IBC) project put the 
number of civilians killed between March 2003 and January 2005 at 15,000 to 17,000.130 
Underlying the variation in numbers were different methodologies. The Lancet study offered a 
projection of total dead based on a sample survey, whereas the IBC recorded civilian deaths that 
were confirmed by impartial sources (i.e., media, NGOs, hospitals, morgues, etc).131 Projecting 
the total number from a sample study could yield a more accurate estimate. But in the case of 
The Lancet study further concerns were raised about methodological flaws in the research design 
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and implementation. These concerns largely centred on the challenges for the survey team in 
having to rely on remote supervision of locally hired researchers to conduct the sample survey.132 
 
Two further complications arise with estimating civilian casualties. First, that available figures 
may not be constructed so as to distinguish between combatant and civilian casualties. This was 
the case with The Lancet study noted above. This problem is indicative of the character of 
contemporary conflicts in which the line between combatant and civilian has become 
increasingly blurred. Second, estimates vary between direct and indirect casualties. Direct 
casualties are those killed and injured in fighting. Indirect casualties include those who are killed 
or suffer serious illness as a consequence of the affects of war, for example, from imprisonment, 
abuse, starvation, or even the destruction of critical infrastructure and services. Estimates of 
‘excess deaths’, such as the The Lancet study include the latter, which would have contributed to 
inflation in the casualty figures in that study. In contrast, the IBC record direct deaths only. 
However, in some cases, full appreciation of the severity of the conflict is impossible without 
including indirect casualties. For example, of the 2 million civilians that perished in Cambodia 
between 1975 and 1978, only 80,000-100,000 were directly killed; the rest died of starvation and 
disease because of the policies of the repressive Pol Pot regime.133 
 
In sum, civilian casualties generally provide a truer estimate of the severity of armed conflict. 
This is increasingly the case with contemporary conflict, which often involves mass violence 
directed against civilians. However, compiling reliable data, especially comparative data, on 
civilian casualties involves methodological choices and challenges. 
 
 
4.4 Population displacement and state failure 
 
The human security paradigm suggests that the severity of armed conflict needs to be assessed in 
the context of broader social impacts, especially for sustainable living. This perspective points to 
two possible metrics. First, is the number of people displaced from their homes, including both 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In UNSC resolutions 688 (1991), 841 (1993) 
and 1199 (1998) – on the humanitarian crises in Northern Iraq, Haiti, and Kosovo respectively – 
refugee flows were recognized as constituting a threat to international peace and security.134 
Moreover, two of these cases triggered an international armed intervention despite the relatively 
low number of civilian deaths prior to intervention: 3,000 in Haiti (between 1991 and 1994) and 
only 500 civilians in Kosovo. Reliable comparative data on refugees and IDPs are usually 
available from the UNCHR. 
 
The second metric is state failure. Where state failure is especially chronic, leading to the 
collapse of infrastructure and basic services (including law and order), life for communities may 
become unsustainable. A number of non-governmental organisations track state failure. The 
most authoritative assessment is provided by the Failed State Index created by the Fund for 
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Peace, which applies 12 measures of state weakness grouped in social, economic and political 
indicators: these include demographic pressures, mass population movement and displacement, 
uneven economic development, sharp economic decline, deterioration of public services, 
widespread violation of human rights, and intervention by external states and other actors.135 We 
are especially interested in the impact of state failure on sustainable living, and this may be 
assessed by looking at statistics for child mortality, food poverty, sanitation, access to clean 
drinking water, and so forth. Of course, state failure is a causal factor in internal armed conflict, 
but equally armed conflict can cause state failure.136 Indeed, there is a strong correlation between 
the two: states that have experienced internal armed conflict are statistically far more likely to 
suffer cycles of spiralling institutional and social failure and repeated conflict.137It should be 
noted that in many cases, mass population displacement and state failure will coexist; the former 
will be an indicator, and may be a further contributor, of the latter.  
 
If we consider conflict severity in four cases – the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Chad, Somalia and Sudan – the importance of these two metrics becomes evident. For each of 
these conflicts we compare metrics for a particular conflict year for which we have been able to 
obtain comparative data.  
 
Table 1: Conflict severity in four cases 
 
 DRC (2000) Chad (2000) Somalia (2007) Sudan (2007) 
Killed in conflict138 36,250 100 547 2718 
Displaced 
population*139 
317,000 54,000 85-115,000 500-625,000 
Under 5 mortality140 17.9% 20.5% 14.2% 10.9% 
Children 
underweight**141 
31.1% 28.1% 35.6% 31% 
* Figures for refugees and IDPs, except for Chad where the figure is for refugees only. 
** Figures for child malnutrition are for DRC in 2001, Chad in 2000, and Somalia and Sudan in 
2006. 
 
The first thing that is immediately striking is that the fatality numbers for these conflicts are low 
with the exception of DRC. Accurate casualty data are especially difficult to obtain. We are 
using the Armed Conflict Dataset compiled by the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) 
in Oslo. These figures are for both battle deaths and civilians killed in conflict. PRIO data offers 
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high and low estimates; the figures above are the high estimates. The war in DRC from 1998-
2003 drew in so many neighbouring states and was waged at such a scale as to lead the US 
Secretary of State to describe it as “Africa’s World War” before the UN Security Council in 
2000.142 In 2000 alone, over 36,000 people were killed in the conflict and almost ten times that 
number displaced from their homes. As might be expected in a country wracked by war, DRC 
was and remains a failed state. The Failed State Index began ranking failed states in 2005, and at 
this time DRC ranked second after the Côte d’Ivoire.143The impact on sustainable living is 
evident with almost one in five children dying before their fifth birthday in 2000, and almost one 
third of children moderately to seriously underweight in 2001.  
 
Compare this with the civil war in Northern Chad from 1998-2002, waged between government 
forces and those of the Movement for Justice and Democracy in Chad. In 2000 only 100 were 
killed in conflict.144However, the conflict created sufficient insecurity to drive over 50,000 to 
flee the country; we do not have figures for IDPs but it would be reasonable to assume that far 
greater numbers of civilians were displaced within the country. The impact on sustainable living 
from this conflict is suggested by child mortality and malnutrition rates that are comparable with 
those in DRC at the time. Looking at more recent armed conflicts, again we find that the 
numbers of combatants and civilians killed provides a poor indicator of the true impact of 
conflict on civilian life. Again, the number of those displaced is hugely disproportionate to the 
number of those directly killed in conflict. In Somalia in 2007, 547 died as a result of fighting 
but 200 times as many people fled their homes. In Sudan, the difference is even more 
pronounced with 2,718 killed and in excess of 600,000 displaced. Moreover, conflict had caused 
both states to collapse: Somalia was ranked third and Sudan was ranked first on the Failed State 
Index in 2007. Child mortality in both states was better than DRC and Chad in 2000 (possibly 
due to more effective humanitarian aid), whilst child malnutrition was as bad in Sudan and worse 
in Somalia in 2007. In sum, as Chad in 2000, and Sudan and Somalia in 2007 demonstrate, even 
when civilian deaths are added to battle deaths, the combined figure can still produce an 
inadequate indicator of conflict severity, especially with regard to the impact on sustainable 
living. 
 
In sum, the above discussion suggests four metrics that may be applied in determining the 
severity of an armed conflict and the accordant threat to civilians: (i) battle deaths, (ii) civilian 
casualties; (iii) population displacement; and (iv) state failure. The changing character of war, 
with the blurring of military and civilian actors and spaces, and rise of civilian targeting, 
suggests that civilian casualties will be a more significant metric than battle deaths in measuring 
war severity. We would also highlight the human security paradigm, which points to the impact 
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It follows from the discussion in section 3 that an assessment of the severity of an armed conflict 
– in terms of intensity of the indiscriminate violence - is at the core of the analysis on the ‘true 
meaning and effect of article 15’145 in both the French courts and the courts for England and 
Wales. The jurisprudence from these courts on Article 15(c) has so far dealt exclusively with 
direct threats in terms of exposure to violence existing as a result of an armed conflict, including 
criminal acts (which according to the UK AIT in KH (Iraq) are not caught by Article 15(c) but 
according to the most recent GS (Afghanistan) case are – see below; the French courts too agree 
that criminal acts are caught by Article 15(c)). Yet, as we have argue above, indirect threats in 
armed conflict exist too, such as rapid and chronic collapse of basic infrastructure and social 
order – and create very serious threats to individuals, especially during the early part of an armed 
conflict when no social coping mechanisms exist.  
 
The Court of Appeal in QD & AH (Iraq) realised the importance of seeking to identify the ‘kind 
or degree of risk to individuals … required to bring a situation of armed conflict within the 
purview of article 15(c)’.146 This had been an issue going beyond what the ECJ had been called 
to rule upon, and so the Court of Appeal referred back to the KH (Iraq) case, as decided by the 
AIT. The Court of Appeal also found that it was not necessary to show a ‘consistent pattern’ of 
harm arising from indiscriminate violence (as expressed in AA (Zimbabwe)) because ‘The risk of 
random injury or death which indiscriminate violence carries is the converse of consistency’.147 
Instead, the Court of Appeal found that an applicant would have to show that incidents of 
indiscriminate violence ‘were happening of a wide scale and in such a way as to be of sufficient 
severity to pose a real risk of serious harm…to civilians generally’.148  The Court of Appeal 
further held that it is not necessary to satisfy an additional test of ‘exceptionality’ because when 
the ECJ used this language in Elgafaji (paras. 37-38), they simply intended to stress the intensity 
of indiscriminate violence. Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that the focus of enquiry is 
simply on the key test: whether the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed 
conflict has reached ‘such a high level’ that the Article 15(c) test is met solely by a civilian being 
present in that territory.  
 
We elaborated above four metrics that may be applied in assessing the severity of an armed 
conflict. The traditional metric is battle casualties. However, given the character of new wars, we 
have argued (in section 4.) that civilian casualties generally provide a truer estimate of the 
severity of armed conflict. Furthermore, the human security paradigm suggests that the severity 
of armed conflict needs to be assessed in the context of broader social impacts, especially for 
sustainable living. This perspective points to two possible metrics. First, is the number of people 
displaced from their homes, including both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
Second, is chronic state failure leading to the collapse of infrastructure and basic services 
(including law and order), and making life for communities unsustainable. 
 
Indeed, it may be argued that the human security is most ‘appropriate as a guide for applying 
Article 15(c), given that the provision’s interpretation of Article 15(c) is to be driven by 
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preambular objectives such as Recital (10), which stresses human dignity’.149 It is also consistent 
with the AIT’s statement in KH (Iraq) that ‘“life or person” is to be given a broad meaning, we 
would accept that the phrase must encompass the means for a person’s survival’.150 It is further 
consistent with the UNHCR submission as an Intervener in QD & AH (Iraq) that all forms of 
violence should be taken into account, i.e., violence emanating both directly from the conflict 
itself, and from other sources such as opportunistic criminals taking advantage of the breakdown 
of law and order.151  
 
We would further argue that for Article 15(c) to be meaningful, its scope must offer something 
going beyond that of Article 15(b) (i.e., Article 3 ECHR). This is especially true in the light of 
the statement of the European Court of Human Rights in NA v. United Kingdom, that ‘only in the 
most extreme cases of general violence’ would forced return entail responsibility under Article 3, 
for example, where ‘the general situation makes it more likely that the authorities will 
systematically ill-treat’ the members of a particular group.152 And in Salah Sheekh v. The 
Netherlands, whilst the Strasbourg Court recognised ‘the acute pertinence of socio-economic and 
humanitarian considerations to the issue of forced returns of rejected asylum seekers to a 
particular part of their country of origin’, it found that ‘such considerations do not necessarily 
have a bearing, and certainly not a decisive one’ on the assessment of real risk under Article 3.153  
 
Here it is important to recall, as we discussed earlier, that both the French Conseil d’Etat, in M. 
Baskarathas, and the AIT, in AM & AM (Somalia), have acknowledged that forced (or mass) 
displacement of civilians constitutes evidence of the existence of severe indiscriminate violence 
in a situation of armed conflict. 
 
In GS (Article 15(c): indiscriminate violence) Afghanistan CG,154 a case recently decided by the 
AIT, the Tribunal considered the applicability of the four metrics we have elaborated herein and 
which, at the time, were presented by Theo Farrell in a written submission to the Tribunal. The 
current phase of armed conflict in Afghanistan has been on-going since 2001. Professor Farrell 
noted that, as wars go, this conflict has killed relatively few combatants. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) lost just over 1,050 personnel killed in action (KIA) from October 
2001 to September 2009.155 There is no reliable data on battle deaths for the Afghan government 
security forces or for the anti-government insurgent forces. Reports suggest that the anti-
government (mostly Taliban) forces have suffered many thousand dead, especially in intense 
fighting in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in 2006-2007.156 At this level of intensity, the 
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armed conflict in Afghanistan exceeds the COW battle-death threshold, but the number is still 
low. The number of civilians killed by the armed conflict also remains mercifully low; from mid 
2006 to late 2009, around 5,900 civilians were directly killed by the war.157 
 
Judging by the numbers of war dead, Afghanistan does not appear to be that severe, and one 
might be inclined to infer from this that the threat to individuals is reasonably low. However, 
when the two additional metrics are applied a different picture emerges. The conflict in 
Afghanistan has resulted in massive displacement of the population. Throughout 2006 and 2007, 
Afghanistan was the leading country of origin for refugees, producing 3.1 million refugees or 
27% of the global refugee population. This amounts to almost 10% of the population of 
Afghanistan. Afghans sought refuge in 72 countries worldwide, though 96% of Afghan refugees 
relocated to Pakistan or Iran.158 The UNCHR also reported a “significant increase” in the IDP 
population in Afghanistan in 2007, though accurate figures for IDPs are more difficult to come 
by.159  
 
Almost continual war since the Soviet invasion of 1979 has shattered the Afghanistan state and 
civil society. Thirty years on, Afghanistan clearly is a failed state. It is ranked seventh on the 
Failed State Index for 2009. Another ranking by the Brookings Institution places Afghanistan 
second in its 2008 ‘Index of State Weakness in the Developing World.’160 The impact on 
sustainable living is evident, with only 1 in 5 Afghans having access to safe drinking water and 
only 12% having access to adequate sanitation in 2008. Infant mortality in Afghanistan is 13% 
and 20% for under-fives. In 2007, 45% of Afghans experience food poverty (i.e., a daily food 
intake below the world minimum standard of 2,100 calories).161 Thus, in terms of population 
displacement and state failure, Afghanistan is a most severe armed conflict that has made 
sustainable living impossible for millions of Afghans who have fled their homes. Accordingly, 
Professor Farrell argued that whilst the direct threat to civilians from being killed may be low in 
this armed conflict, the indirect threat associated from chronic state failure is considerable. 
 
Hence, the AIT was faced with having to decide whether to accept indirect – not just direct – 
consequences of indiscriminate violence when assessing what forms of harm are faced by 
returning civilians and whether ‘such high level’ is met. It considered this question to fall under 
the ‘causal nexus’ between ‘the serious and individual threat’ and ‘the indiscriminate violence’. 
At one end of the spectrum, one would have a solution whereby all the forms and consequences 
of violence in a country should be deemed relevant to Article 15(c). At the other end, one would 
have a most restrictive interpretation of ‘indiscriminate violence’ (such as in KH (Iraq)), as put 
forward by Counsel for the respondent: ‘It is only where the violence which is targeted against 
the military or police is pursued by means which are so excessive and disproportionate that 
civilians are as likely as not to be affected (that is, where the perpetrator of the violence simply 
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does not care who is affected by the attack) that such violence may truly be said to be 
“indiscriminate”’.162 The Tribunal found this to be ‘a question of fact in each case’.163 
 
Looking at the situation in Afghanistan, the AIT noted that ‘a significant proportion of the 
population does not have sufficient food and significant numbers have died of starvation’. Yet, 
and contrary to counsel’s argument for the appellant and UNHCR view, it concluded that ‘it 
cannot be said that such a general situation has come about “by reason of indiscriminate violence 
in situations of international or internal armed conflict”. … The food supply problem cannot be 
shown to be connected otherwise than very remotely to indiscriminate violence, even if it more 
closely connected to armed conflict’.164 Hence, Recital (10) [i.e., seeking to ensure full respect 
for human dignity] is only ‘an aspiration’, and UNHCR view ‘is not persuasive of the 
interpretation of the Qualification Directive’.165 Accordingly, of the four metrics presented by 
Farrell to the AIT, the Tribunal chose to concentrate on civilian casualties because it provides ‘a 
truer estimate of the severity of an armed conflict than battle casualties’166 and because the other 
two (mass population displacement and state failure) ‘may provide reinforcing evidence when 
looking at the severity of an armed conflict, [but] they are not necessarily independent tests of 
conflict severity’.167 The AIT concluded that ‘the numbers of casualties involved would not 
elevate the risk sufficiently to bring the general situation within Article 15(c)’.168 In this case, the 
AIT noted that ‘the one thing which struck us particularly was Professor Farrell’s assertion that 
the number of civilian fatalities directly caused by both sides to the conflict in Afghanistan 
(including those assassinated by the Taliban/al Qaeda) was low in comparison with conflicts of a 
similar size elsewhere.’169  
 
Moving on to the more ‘finessed’ test expressed in paragraph 39 of the Elgafaji ruling, the AIT 
discussed briefly the novel question of ‘enhanced risk to particular categories of individuals’, and 
agreed that examples of such groups could (depending on the facts of each case) be 
‘collaborators’, for example, or a ‘teacher’ or a ‘disabled person’, but found that the applicant did 
not fall into any such enhanced risk category in this case. The AIT further observed that any such 
person may in fact be entitled to refugee status. This is an issue that finds numerous illustrations 
in the French case law, as discussed above, and which has led, at least in France, to subsidiary 
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The case law discussed in this article shows that at present, and despite Article 15(c), there exist 
normative gaps (perhaps less in the law itself than in the way the law is being interpreted) which 
means that people who flee an armed conflict are not finding protection in the UK or France, 
even though they cannot return because their country has become uninhabitable owing to the 
conflict. In both English (including Wales) and French jurisprudence on Article 15(c), the key 
test applied by the courts is that elaborated by the ECJ in Elgafaji (paragraph 35), i.e., the degree 
of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict, which should be of such a high level 
that substantial grounds exist for believing that a civilian, if returned to the relevant 
country/region, would, solely on account of his/her presence there, face a real risk of being 
subject to a serious threat of real harm. However, in applying this test, the case-law from France 
and England shows some important differences. For instance, in the English courts, Article 15(c) 
may not be read in the light of IHL, whereas it may in the French courts. The English courts 
specify that Article 15(c) is concerned with serious threats of real harm and does not require a 
consistent pattern of risk. The French courts approach Article 15(c) slightly differently, 
recognising that ‘generalised violence’ is inherent to a situation of armed conflict and in fact 
characterises it.  
 
The English courts have been struggling with the question of how to assess the severity of armed 
conflict and associated seriousness of risk of real harm, in applying Article 15(c). As noted 
above, the French courts have yet to consider this question; instead they have applied the 
grounds for protection specified under the Refugee Convention in considering cases for 
subsidiary protection. In this article, we have elaborated four metrics for assessing conflict 
severity: battle casualties, civilian casualties, population displacement, and state failure. From an 
assessment of conflict severity, one may infer seriousness of risk to individuals from 
indiscriminate violence. We have argued that the character of armed conflict has changed in such 
a manner has to increase the exposure of civilians to the effects of war. This would give added 
weigh to the value of civilian casualties over battle casualties in assessing conflict severity. We 
also noted the rise of the human security paradigm, which highlights the indirect threats from 
armed conflict to sustainable life by communities. Accordingly, we proposed population 
displacement and chronic state failure as two key metrics in assessing the impact of armed 
conflict on sustainable living. All four metrics were recently considered by the AIT in the GS 
(Afghanistan) case. The AIT accepted the argument that civilian casualties provided a more 
useful metric than battle casualties in considering a case involving the ongoing armed conflict in 
Afghanistan. However, the Tribunal was not inclined to recognise population displacement and 
state failure as useful metrics in this case, because the causal link between armed conflict and 
these phenomena were deemed too complex to unpack. As it happens, the AIT had previously 
acknowledged in AM & AM (Somalia) mass displacement as indicative of conflict severity, as 
has the French Conseil d’Etat in M. Baskarathas. We recognise that demonstrating the causal 
links between armed conflict and mass population displacement and chronic state failure 
represents a significant empirical challenge. But there are growing bodies of scholarship that 
demonstrate in empirical detail what is obvious as a general observation: armed conflict 
destabilises states, and populations flee areas of armed conflict because life becomes 
unsustainable in such areas.170  
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As a final observation, we would note recent development in human rights jurisprudence which 
gives added normative weigh to consideration of indirect threats in applying Article 15(c). The 
European Court of Human Rights in NA v United Kingdom recognised, in paragraph 115,  ‘the 
possibility that a general situation of violence in a country of destination [may] be of sufficient 
level of intensity as to entail’ protection under Article 3 ECHR, but only in the most extreme 
cases of general violence. When assessing ‘real risk’, the Strasbourg Court found socio-
economic and humanitarian considerations, although relevant, not to have a decisive bearing on 
the assessment. The Dutch Council of State, on 25 May 2009 in the Elgafaji case, re-affirmed 
that Article 3 ECHR includes the exceptional circumstances covered by Article 15(c), as laid 
down in paragraph 43 of the ECJ’s ruling in this case, which it claimed corresponds to paragraph 
115 of the European Court of Human Rights in NA v United Kingdom. So, the usefulness of 
Article 15(c), as currently interpreted by the national courts, remains in question. As McAdam 
noted a ‘deep-seated fear that whole populations will flee on the basis of generalized violence if 
subsidiary protection status does not require individual harm to be demonstrated’171 seems to 
have tainted the whole system. Hence, an argument may also be made here for the phrase 
‘indiscriminate violence’ in Article 15(c) to include indirect threats on the basis of respect for 
human dignity. In this regard, the human security paradigm could prove to be a valuable guide 
for the courts. 
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